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Abstract: The Baron of Rio Branco is popularly known as the greatest diplomat in Brazil's 
history. In the literature on Brazilian Foreign Policy, the Baron is seen (along with Joaquim 
Nabuco) as the founder of Americanism, a foreign policy paradigm in which bilateral 
relations with the United States were privileged within the Brazilian diplomatic agenda. This 
paradigm has been adopted with little opposition by the Foreign Ministry until the 1950s 
when it was gradually replaced by a globalist paradigm that defines the Brazilian foreign 
policy since. Without completely denying this now traditional perspective, this article makes a 
brief assessment of relations between Brazil and the United States in the 19th century, ie 
before the Baron became foreign minister of Brazil. What is observed is that Brazil and the 
United States had peaceful, although distant, relations during most of the 19th century. This 
scenario, however, went through significant changes at the end of the century. Thus, it is 
important to note that the Baron and Nabucco have not created a new paradigm without any 
precedent. The analysis provided here is intended to help better consider the role of the Baron 
and Nabucco in the history of Brazilian foreign policy, particularly in relations between Brazil 
and the United States. 
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RELAÇÕES BRASIL-ESTADOS UNIDOS DE TIRADENTES AO BARÃO DO RIO 
BRANCO 
Resumo: O Barão de Rio Branco é reconhecidamente um dos maiores diplomatas da história 
do Brasil. Na literatura a respeito de Política Externa Brasileira, o Barão é visto (juntamente 
com Joaquim Nabuco) como o fundador do Americanismo, um paradigma de política externa 
no qual as relações bilaterais com os Estados Unidos foram privilegiadas dentro da agenda 
diplomática brasileira. Este paradigma foi adotado com pouca oposição pelo Itamaraty até a 
década de 1950, quando foi aos poucos substituído por um paradigma globalista, que define a 
política externa brasileira desde então. Sem negar completamente esta perspectiva já 
tradicional, o presente artigo faz uma breve avaliação das relações entre Brasil e Estados 
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Unidos no século 19, ou seja, antes do Barão tornar-se ministro das relações exteriores do 
Brasil. O que se observa é que Brasil e Estados Unidos tiveram relações pacíficas durante a 
maior parte do século 19, ainda que distantes. Este quadro, porém, passou por significativas 
mudanças no final daquele século. Desta forma, é importante observar que o Barão e Nabuco 
não criaram um novo paradigma sem qualquer tipo de precedente. A análise oferecida aqui 
tem o objetivo de ajudar a considerar melhor o papel do Barão e de Nabuco na história da 
política externa brasileira, particularmente nas relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos. 
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José Maria Paranhos da Silva Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco, is a highly praised 
figure in Brazilian heroe’s pantheon. Name of streets, avenues and city squares all over 
Brazil, the Baron is also celebrated by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations as Brazil’s 
greatest diplomat in history, the man behind the “Rio Branco Institute”, center of formation 
for Brazilian diplomats, and even the “Rio Branco’s House”, name sometimes used for the 
ministry itself. Even if we choose to ignore the distinctions between the man and the myth, 
Rio Branco’s contributions to Brazilian foreign policy were indeed great: he consolidated 
Brazilian limits, affirmed the principle of judicial equality between nations, established the 
principle of non-intervention on neighboring countries, all that and more as it has been said 
“without making any injustice or shedding a drop of blood”. Most of all, the Baron was also 
responsible for consolidating the shift of Brazilian diplomatic axis from Europe (mainly 
England) to the United States, establishing a paradigm in Brazilian foreign policy often called 
Americanism. This paradigm persisted with little opposition until the early 1960s, when it 
was replaced by Globalism, to be briefly brought back from 1964 to 1967. Although Brazil 
does not officially hold to the same paradigm since then, Brazil-USA relations are still 
important to both sides. The USA is still Brazil's major partner in several areas, and although 
this relation is not equally important for the USA, the tendency in Washington is to hold 
Brazil as an important partner, at least in Latin America (BUENO e CERVO, 2002). 
The objective of this text is to help better consider the role of the Baron in the history 
of Brazilian foreign policy, particularly in relations between Brazil and the United States. 
Although this history is spread through several texts about Brazilian foreign policy, USA 
foreign policy, the Baron of Rio Branco and other themes, I don’t find recent academic 
articles that deal specifically with this. Some books have been published about this over time, 
some of the most important ones almost a century ago. I believe that Brazil-USA relations in 
the 19th century deserve new research and publications, and this article is a contribution to this 
effort. Other than that, this article was written having in mind that the Baron of Rio Branco 
was born in the 19th century (in 1845 to be precise), and was already a grown man when he 
became chancellor. So, he lived through most of the events I narrate here, and it is clear that 
he had then in mind when he took the decision of establishing Americanism as Brazil’s 
paradigm of foreign policy. In other words, to know more about Brazil-USA relations before 
Rio Branco may be to better understand Rio Branco’s policy towards the USA.  
The Baron didn’t consolidate the shift of Brazilian diplomatic axis from Europe 
(mainly England) to the United States all by himself. A central part of this shift was to raise 
the diplomatic representation of Brazil in the United States to the level of embassy, 
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nominating the already famous Joaquim Nabuco to be Brazil’s first ambassador in 
Washington. As much as the Baron (or maybe even more), Nabuco was a defender of closer 
relations between Brazil and USA and deserves at least as much credit for the shift. Actually, 
Brazil had at that time a favorable scenario for the change operated by Nabuco and the Baron: 
the Republican regime established in 1889 was in great part modeled after the USA (certainly 
this can be said of the Republican Constitution of 1891, mostly written by Rui Barbosa with 
the American Constitution as a blueprint), and economic ties between the two countries were 
increasing since the late 1800s, especially with Brazil coffee exports to the USA. It can be 
said that the Baron just confirmed a tendency observed for some decades then. 
Despite the somewhat negative observations in the paragraph above, the Baron of Rio 
Branco was indeed a great character in Brazilian history, especially its diplomatic history, and 
also to Brazil-USA relations. But it is important to notice that he didn't start Brazil-USA 
relations ex nihilo in early 20th century. First, USA was the first country to recognize Brazil’s 
independence from Portugal (before Portugal itself or even England, a country that, compared 
to USA, would enjoy closer relations with Brazil in the first half of the 19th century), a fact 
that the Baron himself would highlight in his decision to bring the countries closer together. 
Second, although the two countries were somewhat mutually unimportant for most of the 19th 
century, Brazil and USA experienced mostly positive relations for almost 80 years before the 
Baron became Brazil’s chancellor. Third, as already noticed, this relation was changing from 
mild to more important before the Baron actually decided to make it central to Brazilian 
foreign policy. 
The structure of the text is mainly chronological. I start with Brazil-USA relations 
when, to be completely strict, there was no Brazil as an independent and sovereign state, and 
from there I move through the 19th century, highlighting some of the most important themes 
in the countries’ bilateral relations. Naturally, dealing with a long period of time, because of 
space restrictions not all events can be approached with due depth, and it is possible that 
events considered relevant by some are forgotten. Anyway, I hope the text will allow a 
sufficient understanding of the fundamental: the Baron did not establish his Americanism in a 
vacuum. Although Brazil and the United States were not particularly close during the 19th 
century, their relations served as a backdrop to the paradigm that was established in the early 
20th century. Although some primary sources are used, I also want to make some of the 
secondary sources concerning this theme better known, so they are cited in the text. 
Hopefully, this article will help researchers and students of Brazilian foreign policy, 
USA foreign policy, Brazil-USA relations and others to have a better understanding of several 
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themes and also to start from here to develop deeper researches on the several themes I 
introduce. 
 
Brazil-USA relations from 1789 to 1822: Washington, Rio de Janeiro, and the other 
independences 
 
 Brazil-USA relations start even before Brazil was formally an independent country. 
One example of this is the influence of American ideas in the Conjuração Mineira of 1789. 
There is even evidence that some of the rebels in Minas Gerais tried to obtain support from 
Thomas Jefferson. Anyway, it is clear that liberals in late 18th century Brazil had access to 
American writing, such as the Federalist Papers and even the Constitution itself, already 
translated into Portuguese in 1789. Although the movement in Minas Gerais was defeated by 
the Portuguese Crown, American ideological influence in Brazil was not over by then 
(BANDEIRA, 1978; HILL, 1932; BURNS, 2003: 58).  
Although Brazilian independence is officially dated to September 7, 1822, it can be 
said that the actual independence was an ongoing process started in 1808 and was 
consolidated in 1840 (BARMAN, 1998:205-212; EAKIN, 2007:217; EAKIN, 1998:37). 
Moreover, the independence proclaimed in 1822 was only one project of emancipation among 
others. D. Pedro I was connected to a group of emancipationists concentrated in Rio de 
Janeiro. Meanwhile, other independence projects were under way in the country, with 
emphasis on a movement in Pernambuco, in the northeast (MELLO, 2004). 
The first step in the process of independence led by Rio de Janeiro was the Portuguese 
royal family move from Lisbon to that city. Instead of condemning this move as an unwanted 
European and monarchical interference in the continent, Jefferson took a more practical 
approach and welcomed Dom João to the Americas. Henry Hill, sent by Jefferson to Rio de 
Janeiro, was the first American diplomat to Latin America. With the Portuguese capital move 
to Brazil, the president expected that a partner state would eventually emerge in the 
Hemisphere. Dom João was also cordial towards the Americans, as much as he was to the 
English, granting them several prerogatives on Brazilian soil (FONTAINE, 1974:10-11; 
HILL, 1932: 3-4). 
Brazil was elevated to the status of United Kingdom with Portugal and Algarves in 
1815, Dom João was called back to Lisbon by the Portuguese Cortes, and finally Brazil 
independence was proclaimed by his son Dom Pedro I, in 1822. Meanwhile, American 
presidents followed Jefferson’s steps. James Madison sent Thomas Sumter Jr. as new minister 
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to Rio de Janeiro, and despite losses when compared to the English, American trade with 
Brazil grew steadily from 1808 to 1811 (HILL, 1932:6). James Monroe didn’t answer the cry 
for help from the republican movement in Pernambuco, in 1817, a gesture that would be 
repeated in 1824 in relation to the Confederation of the Equator (MELLO, 2004:223-224). 
Instead, he chose to keep the good relations with the Portuguese court in Rio, and finally was 
the first head of state to recognize Brazilian independence from Portugal, in 1824, majorly 
continuing the relations already established with Dom João and then Dom Pedro I. 
 Despite the overall auspicious beginning, Brazil-USA relations in this period were not 
without misunderstanding. Portugal was neutral during the War of 1812, and similarly, USA 
was neutral towards the Pernambucan revolt in 1817, even though the rebels tried to obtain 
support from Washington. In both cases, mere neutrality was not what both parts expected 
from the perceived partners (HILL, 1932:10-25). Thomas Sumter Jr. was able to increase 
trade between Brazil and USA, but he was also unable to adapt to the customs of a 
monarchical European court, establishing a precedent that many American diplomats in Rio 
would follow (HILL, 1932:7, 94, 96). At times Condy Raguet (1825-1828), Henry A. Wise 
(1844-1847) and James Watson Webb (1861-1869) were not very diplomatic in their dealings 
with Brazilian authorities and the Brazilian public in general. It seems like sometimes 
Washington preferred to send the best diplomats to Europe, and left for Brazil people without 
the same formation. On the other hand, Brazil treatment towards the USA was not very 
different from that (BURNS, 2003:58-59). Finally, despite obvious gains on trade, American 
diplomacy felt postponed by Brazilians, who favored England in their trade agreements, 
something that ministers in Rio tried to reverse, but mostly to no avail (HILL, 1932:5, 105-
109; FONTAINE, 1974:9-10).  
 
Brazil-USA relations in the First Reign: from an auspicious beginning to confusion and 
misunderstanding 
 
As mentioned before, following Jefferson’s steps when he welcomed Dom João to the 
Americas, James Monroe was the first head of state to recognize Brazilian independence after 
the Cry of Ipiranga, in 1822. Listening to John Quincy Adams’ advice, Monroe was being 
practical: he could choose a more strict interpretation of his own diplomatic doctrine, 
announced in 1823, and oppose a monarchical regime in the continent, ruled by the 
Portuguese-born Dom Pedro I. Instead, he welcomed the new addition to the American 
international system. Adams was hopeful that at some point Brazil would become a republic, 
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and anyway, without Portuguese intervention, Brazilian trade was welcomed by USA 
(FONTAINE, 1974:11). On its part, Brazil was the only Latin American country to recognize 
the Monroe Doctrine, and even to propose a military alliance with USA (FONTAINE, 
1974:12). But the transition from Dom João to Dom Pedro I was not plentifully smooth for 
Brazil-USA relations: some people in Brazilian elite were unenthusiastic about American 
recognition of Brazil's independence. They believed that recognition from a republican, 
moreover what they viewed as a young and unimportant republic as the USA, meant little for 
Brazil (HILL, 1932:30), and despite Monroe’s and Adams’ initial gesture, the difference of 
political regime between the two countries would again be reason for animosity in the years to 
come (HILL, 1932:91-93, 96, 100). Overall, Brazil-USA relations in the next five decades 
were not a reason for great celebration on either side (SMITH, 1991:3-5; SMITH, 2010:13; 
HILL, 1932:73). 
As mentioned before, Brazilian independence did not happen abruptly in 1822. The 
independence process started with Dom João move to Brazil, in 1808, continued with the 
elevation of the country to United Kingdom with Portugal in 1815, had a new and important 
step with the Cry of Ipiranga, in 1822, and continued during Dom Pedro I’s reign, from 1822 
to 1831. In this period American diplomacy was still trying to beat the English in trade with 
Brazil (HILL, 1932:33), but some deeper grievances started to appear between the North and 
South American countries. Condy Raguet, the new Washington’s envoy to Brazil, constantly 
complained to his superiors in the USA about the harsh conditions of customs in Rio. But 
even worse in Raguet’s view were the consequences of the Cisplatine War to the USA. 
During the conflict Brazilian ships blocked the Plata river, regularly stopping and boarding 
American ships for search. The diplomat was distressed with the treatment to American 
sailors and ships up to the point threatening the Brazilians (who he considered an uncivilized 
people) with war. Dom Pedro I personally intervened in the situation and John Quincy Adams 
reproved the behavior of his envoy and replaced him for William Tudor, who was later 
praised by Adams for his successes in increasing bilateral trade. Nevertheless, things were 
also changing in the USA: unlike Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, Adams was succeeded by a 
rival, Andrew Jackson. Jackson didn't follow Tudor's advice, and recognized the government 
of Dom Miguel, Dom Pedro I's rival, in Portugal. This gesture, along with the Cisplatine 
incidents, strained bilateral relations in the years to come (HILL, 1932:39-56, 63-73). 
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Brazil-USA relations in the early Second Reign: American Civil War, Confederate 
Immigration, steamships and opening Brazilian rivers to world trade   
 
Brazil’s independence process was consolidated in 1840. Following several political 
difficulties and answering to problems in Portugal, Dom Pedro I left Brazil in 1831. What 
followed was a decade of regencies, although Dom Pedro II, Dom Pedro I’s son and heir 
apparent, was expected to be crowned when reaching adulthood. That was anticipated in 1840 
when Dom Pedro II was 14 years old, and so Brazil had a Brazilian-born monarch who would 
reign until been overthrown by a military coup, in 1889. Moreover, even by North-American 
standards, his reign was mostly a period of stability in several senses. Brazil-USA relations, 
on the other hands, were lukewarm for about half of this time. A sad exception to this was 
that, while England pressured Brazil for the end of the slave trade, a great number of the 
Africans arriving in Brazil came in American ships. While some of the American ministers in 
Rio warned their superiors about this (we can mention George H. Proffit, Henry A. Wise, 
David Tod and Robert C. Schenck), there was little to no action in Washington to stop this 
practice, something explained by the distance between Brazil (and the practical difficulties 
related to this), but also by the dispute between USA and England over leadership in Latin 
America (HILL, 1932:110-136, 143-144).  
 During the Civil War (1861-1865), Brazil-USA relations were difficult. Similarly to 
what happened before, during the Pernambuco Revolt of 1817 or the Cisplatine War, in the 
1860s Brazil granted the Confederate States the status of belligerents and remained neutral 
towards the conflict in North America. In very practical terms, this meant that Confederate 
ships could use Brazilian ports as part of their strategy, much to the discontent of Lincoln. 
Closer to the end of the war Brazil decided in favor of the Washington government, but the 
relations between the two countries had already suffered some damage by then (BURNS, 
2003:59; HILL, 1932:152-153, 158-159; FONTAINE, 1974:13).  
The USA emerged from the Civil War as a more united country, and also with a more 
powerful executive and an economy in rapid expansion. Initially, the country was unwilling to 
pursue a more participative role in world affairs. Albeit slowly, but surely, this started to 
change as well. In this process, Brazil-USA relations also started to change. Some of the 
confederate veterans (unsatisfied with the defeat) decided to move to Brazil. That excited 
Brazilian elites, who were in search of workforce to replace the Africans, since slavery was in 
process of abolition, especially since the end of the slave traffic in 1850 (BURNS, 2003:59). 
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 The more excited Brazilians and Americans expected that hundreds of thousands of 
veterans with their families would move to Brazil. Some Brazilians were concerned that the 
Americans would be more conscious of their rights as immigrants, and would make tougher 
demands than the Germans who came in previous decades. Others (especially liberals) 
believed that the Americans would bring progress with them. Anyway, the general opinion 
was that the confederate immigration would not pass unnoticed (VIEIRA, 1980:216-217). 
The liberals welcomed the confederates enthusiastically and even created immigration 
societies to help. The Brazilian government was in general welcoming as well, trying to 
facilitate the immigration process, even with easy land and money access. There was 
especially an expectation that the former combatants could join the Brazilian forces in the 
Paraguayan War, bringing their military experience with them (HILL, 1932:241-243). 
The reality was very far from the expectations. Only about 8 to 10 thousand former 
confederates moved to various parts of Latin America, and just a few of these eventually 
arrived in Brazil. A small number came really fast, looking for a fresh start after the war. 
Others were more cautious, and first arranged their own migration societies (HILL, 
1932:239). Of these, most were concentrated in few colonies, especially in western São Paulo, 
instead of spreading through the country as Brazilian elites would have it (HILL, 1932:243-
244). Concerning the Paraguayan War, Brazilian expectations were completely frustrated: war 
weary, the veterans of the Civil War would have no business in a new conflict in South 
America (HILL, 1932:257-258). 
The confederate exile to Brazil intensified contacts between the two countries for a 
while, but with little lasting results. Some considerations can be done about it: first, just a 
small number of confederates actually made it to Brazil. Washington would not help them (as 
it might be expected, concerning former enemies of the Northern government), and despite all 
the help offered by the Brazilian government, the veterans of the Civil War never seemed as 
enthusiastic about it as the Brazilians, especially Brazilian liberals (HILL, 1932:255-257). 
Second, there is some irony to the fact that the veterans chose Brazil of all countries as a site 
for immigration. Considering they fought a war for slavery back in North America, Brazil 
with slavery still in place could at first seem to be a good choice, but on hindsight, the 
abolition process in Brazil was inevitable (even if handled very carefully by authorities). 
Other than that, former slaves in Brazil were not legally differentiated by their skin color and 
had even more rights than white foreigners. The confederates, on their part, never applied for 
Brazilian citizenship, although that was not bureaucratically a difficult matter. It seems that, 
although living in Brazil, they never fully desired cutting ties with their motherland (HILL, 
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1932:257-258). Nevertheless, the confederates contributed to the development of some 
Brazilian cities, especially in the province of São Paulo, including Americana and Santa 
Bárbara do Oeste (HILL, 1932: 252-255). In addition, the confederates also contributed to the 
growth of Protestantism in Brazil (FERREIRA, 1992: 247-248, MATOS, 2004: 13-14). 
 During the Civil War, USA was represented in Brazil by James Watson Webb (1861-
1869). Born in New York and without prior diplomatic experience, it seems that Webb was 
chosen for the task at least in part because of his political connections to other New Yorker, 
the secretary of state William H. Seward (HILL, 1932:147). Although his permanence in 
Brazil was long when compared to other diplomats in the 19th century, Webb’s diplomacy 
was not particularly successful in developing Brazil-USA relations. Among his proposals was 
creating a colony for freed slaves in the Brazilian Amazon and buying the French Guyana. 
Webb's ideas were mostly not welcomed in the USA, not even by Seward, but on the other 
hand, they sometimes frightened Brazilians who were already afraid of an American 
intervention in the Amazon (HILL, 1932:159-162, 174-176). 
 Another project Webb tried to convey was the establishment of a steamboat line 
connecting Brazil and USA. Such lines were already established between Brazil and England, 
and so it seemed just natural for Americans to do the same, and to avoid losing political and 
economic influence over Brazil to the Europeans (HILL, 1932:163). Although this project 
was welcomed in Washington, he had competition, especially from Thomas Rainey, a 
businessman also interested in connecting Brazil and USA by the steam engine. Webb wanted 
his son (or even himself) to own any steamboat line between the two countries, a detail he 
tried to hide from Lincoln. Meanwhile, he expected that Seward would favor him in the 
Congress (HILL, 1932:165-166). Webb’s schemes delayed the project as they raised 
suspicions both in Brazil and USA, but in 1865 a steamboat line was eventually established 
connecting the two countries, something that helped to bring them closer together. Webb’s 
company was not chosen, and he abandoned the idea considering that his country was 
unthankful for all his services (HILL, 1932:168-171). 
 Shortly after the Civil War was over, another major event happened in Brazil-USA 
relations: the opening of the Amazon River to international navigation and trade. American 
interest about the Amazon can be dated back to the early 1850s, with The Amazon, and the 
Atlantic Slopes of South America a publication by navy officer Matthew Fontaine Maury. In 
it, Maury reported that due to sea currents, the Amazon was a continuation of the Mississippi 
and that opening it to navigation and trade would benefit New Orleans, Louisiana and finally 
the entire USA. William L. Herndon, cousin of Maury (and also an officer in the American 
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Navy), would guide an expedition on the Amazon from the Andes with Lardner Gibbon (yet 
another American Navy officer) in 1851. The result of this expedition was a report delivered 
to the Congress in 1853 and published by presidential order from Franklin Pierce in 1854 as 
Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon (HERNDON & GIBBON, 1854). 
 News about American expeditions on the Amazon were not welcome in Rio de 
Janeiro. It should be noticed that by this time the USA was forcibly opening Japan to 
international trade, that the Mexican-American War was still a very recent event and that the 
1850s was a decade of famous filibuster expeditions in Central America, if not with support, 
at least with connivance by Franklin Pierce (MCPHERSON, 1988: 112). William Trousdale, 
American minister in Rio, arrived in the city in 1853 with explicit orders to obtain with Brazil 
a treaty of free navigation on the Amazon. On the other hand, Francisco Ignácio de Carvalho 
Moreira, Brazilian envoy to Washington, talked with secretary of state William Learned 
Marcy on more than one occasion about his concerns about American expeditions on the 
Amazon. Marcy tried to calm Moreira, but the atmosphere in Rio was still tense (HILL, 
1932:226). 
José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, Brazilian minister of 
foreign relations (1855-1857, 1858-1859, 1861) was cautious or even unwilling to open the 
river, as was the emperor himself (Pedro II, 1956:75). Paranhos resisted Trousdale as well as 
Richard K. Meade and James Watson Webb on this matter (HILL, 1932:159-162, 229-234). 
On the other hand, liberal congressman Aureliano Candido Tavares Bastos was very much in 
favor of it and defended the idea in several publications in Brazil and USA during the 1860s 
(HILL, 1932:235-236). Bastos was helped by some Americans, of which we can highlight 
James Cooley Fletcher, author of Brazil and the Brazilians: portrayed in historical and 
descriptive sketches (1857). Fletcher was in Rio as a missionary from 1852 to 1854 and again 
in 1855 (he would return in other occasions) and raised the issue of the opening of the 
Amazon River to international navigation through articles about the issue through local 
newspapers in Rio de Janeiro (VIEIRA, 1980:95). Although his opinions were very different 
from Maury’s, Herndon’s and Gibbon’s in important aspects, he also considered that the 
opening of the river to international trading and navigation would be an unparalleled event for 
the international trade (KIDDER e FLETCHER, 1857:570). At the same time, he evaluated 
that, though scientifically accurate, Maury’s propositions regarding the Amazon and its 
navigation had hindered the approach between Brazil and United States. According to the 
Missionary, since Maury’s work was published, it has had been impossible to negotiate a 
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treaty with Brazil, a country with which the US had extreme necessity of establishing closer 
relations (KIDDER e FLETCHER, 1866:578-580). 
American interest in the Amazon was dormant for a while but returned after the Civil 
War and with the Confederates’ immigration to Brazil (HILL, 1932:214-218). Up to that time, 
American diplomacy was successful in establishing treaties with Peru, but Brazil answered 
these with treaties with Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and New Granada. Eventually, the 
Americans realized that a successful treaty was impossible without Brazil, a country that had 
not only the mouth of the river but also most of its extension (HILL, 1932:223-225).  
In 1865, when chances of opening the river seemed minimal, a new event precipitated 
changes: Swiss-American biologist and geologist Jean Louis Rodolphe Agassiz, professor at 
Harvard, led the Thayer Expedition to the Amazon (RIBEIRO, 1987:9). Agassiz had an old 
interest in Brazilian fish - he even published a book about it in 1829 (SPIX; AGASSIZ; 
MARTIUS, 1829) - and this interest was renewed by James Cooley Fletcher. When Fletcher 
returned to the USA from Brazil in 1856, he sought to become a link between the Emperor 
Dom Pedro II and some American sages, among who was Agassiz. The result was a long 
lasting friendship between the Emperor and his “friends from New England” (VIEIRA, 
1980:73; JAMES, 1952). Between 1862 and 1863, Fletcher was again in Brazil, this time as 
an agent of the American Sunday School Union. In this period, upon Professor Louis 
Agassiz’s request, he sailed almost two thousand miles through the Amazon River collecting 
specimens for ichthyological studies (VIEIRA, 1980:97. RIBEIRO, 1981:128; RIBEIRO, 
1987:9; FERREIRA, 1992:78-79). In 1865, the Missionary was back to Brazil to have 
Professor Agassiz in Rio.  
On May 28, a dinner was organized to celebrate the Scientist’s birthday, with the 
presence of Fletcher and other missionaries. According to the Historian David Gueiros, 
Fletcher’s involvement with Agassiz’s scientific expedition was such that, judging by the 
available documentation, “it seemed to his Brazilian friends that such an expedition was of his 
own making” (VIEIRA, 1980:76-78). Fletcher was quick in dismantling overstatements about 
his role on Agassiz’s visit to Brazil—the Diário do Rio de Janeiro even published the news 
that he was in Rio to introduce the scientist, what he denied in correspondence with the 
Emperor, declaring that Agassiz needed no introduction (JAMES, 1952:70-71). Even though, 
of course, the missionary used the Thayer Expedition and Agassiz’s prestige to promote 
several projects that for years he had defended in the United States and in Brazil—the 
emancipation of slaves, the opening of the Amazon to international navigation, the 
International Immigration Society, and the New York-Rio de Janeiro steamship line. The 
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Emperor himself offered personal help for the Thayer Expedition, and returning home in 
August 1866, Agassiz wrote an account of this expedition, entitled A Journey in Brazil, 
published in 1868. On December 7, 1866, just five months after the Expedition, the River was 
opened for navigation and trade (HILL, 1932:236-238. FONTAINE, 1974:13-14).  
When the Civil War was not yet finished a new conflict began in the Americas, this 
time in the South and involving Brazil: the Paraguayan War (1864-1870). It also had impacts 
on Brazil-USA relations (HILL, 1932:177). James Watson Webb, the belligerent diplomat 
aforementioned, wanted to mediate the conflict, although initially, this was unauthorized by 
Washington. Eventually, Webb received authorization from the American government and the 
mediation was accepted by Paraguay, but declined by Brazil. Webb interpreted - correctly 
according to modern researchers (DORATIOTO, 2002) - that Brazil wanted nothing but 
complete victory because it feared for the future of the monarchy in case of another scenario 
(HILL, 1932:195-196). Webb was also not in favor of Paraguay: he and Charles A. 
Washburn, American minister to Asunción, had difficult times with the Paraguayan dictator 
Francisco Solano López. Anyway, that did not stop Webb from pressing the Brazilian 
government for reparations to American citizens who suffered losses during the war (HILL, 
1932:197-206). In short, during the Paraguayan War, Webb’s diplomacy was of no help for 
Brazil-USA relations (HILL, 1932:213). 
 
Brazil-USA relations in the late Second Reign: the Emperor's visit to the USA, changes 
in US foreign policy and general rapprochement 
 
 Summarizing what we saw so far, it is fair to say that Brazil-USA relations from the 
1820s up to the early 1870s was not a very close one. It is only in the mid-1870s that this 
picture started to change. An important moment to precipitate this was Dom Pedro II's visit to 
the USA in 1876, for the celebration of the independence centennial. Although Brazil was still 
diplomatically closer to England and USA was busier occupying the west, reconstructing the 
South and developing its industry, the presence of Dom Pedro II in American soil helped to 
readjust the picture Americans had of Brazil. The Emperor was initially received coldly, but 
soon the American public became impressed by his intelligence, culture and overall manners. 
The positive view of the Emperor resulted in a more positive view of his country, paving the 
way for more friendly relations in the years to come (BURNS, 2003:59-60. CARVALHO, 
2007:157-170). Other factors helped in this as well: the connection between Rio and New 
York by steamboat and communications by telegraph among them (HILL, 1932:260-262). 
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 Closer to the end of the 19th century, American diplomacy in general also went 
through a series of changes that would eventually remove it from the classic unilateralism of 
the founding fathers to a multilateralism especially associated with Woodrow Wilson. These 
changes would also eventually impact on relations between Brazil and the United States. An 
important part of these changes, especially concerning Latin America, happened in James 
Garfield’s presidency (1881), more specifically with James G. Blaine as his secretary of state 
(BEISNER, 1986). Blaine tried to put in practice a pan-Americanism that he entertained 
already for years (Blaine and Pan Americanism, 1880s/1890s, in 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/Blaine. Access on January 28, 2013). Among 
his policies were trying to secure the monopoly of a canal in Central America, connecting the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans (something that would only be actually implemented later, with 
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901) and offering help (although declined) to mediate the 
Pacific War of 1879-1883. But most of all, Blaine wanted the USA to host a Pan-American 
Conference to settle all these and other issues. Garfield was assassinated soon after his 
inauguration, and his successor vice-president Chester Arthur was not as supportive of 
Blaine’s projects. Blaine resigned soon after. 
When Benjamin Harrison succeeded Grover Cleveland to the presidency, James G. 
Blaine could resume his job as secretary of state, and in 1889 he finally hosted the Pan-
American Conference he dreamed of for so long. Blaine’s most advanced aim was to create a 
free trade area encompassing the whole continent. The next best thing would be to establish 
several individual trade agreements of some sort. He also wanted to reduce European 
influence on the Hemisphere. Despite Blaine’s intense campaign not only with Latin America, 
but also with Canada and the Caribbean, American jingoism, even from former days, raised 
suspicion in Latin America, and despite his best intentions Blaine’s greatest victory was to 
strengthen ties with specific countries in specific issues, but without the all-encompassing 
treaty he expected. For reasons not so clear Blaine pulled away again the secretary of state, 
and passed away not long after, in 1893 (http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898 Access 
on March 7, 2013). 
Grover Cleveland returned to the White House after Benjamin Harrison, and this 
presidency foreign policy towards Latin America was faced with the border dispute between 
England (in English Guyana) and Venezuela, between 1895 and 1899. Strictly speaking, the 
beginning of this dispute dates from 1814, when Britain acquired British Guiana (now 
Guyana) from the Netherlands. The treaty of ownership transfer did not provide for a western 
border to the region, and so, in 1835, Britain established this in the Schomburgk Line, which 
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increased the territory of Guyana at the expense of Venezuela (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:112-
114). In 1841 Venezuela officially questioned the border declared by England, complaining 
that its eastern border would be on the Essequibo River, a claim that would withdraw from 
Guyana two-thirds of its territory. With the discovery of gold in the area in dispute, Britain 
sought to establish the border further west of Schomburgk Line. In 1876 Venezuela protested, 
broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, and called for assistance from the US, citing the 
Monroe Doctrine. For nineteen years Venezuela called for US support, without success. 
However, in 1895, Richard Olney, Cleveland’s Secretary of State in his second term, invoked 
the Monroe Doctrine to demand Britain to submit the matter to US will. The English response 
was that the Monroe Doctrine had no validity as international law. Nevertheless, Cleveland 
and Congress created a commission to resolve the border issue “by any means”. Rumors of 
war between the US and England began to circulate in the American press. 
This border dispute between Venezuela and England, and the US role in the case, 
served as a backdrop for the emergence of the Olney Doctrine, Richard Olney’s interpretation 
of the Monroe Doctrine: the US assumed the role of great power, and especially the 
prerogative over the Western hemisphere (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:113). Pressured by the Boer 
War in South Africa and the administration of a vast colonial empire, Britain preferred to 
avoid conflict and to refer the border dispute to the American will. The news was received 
with enthusiasm in Venezuela, sure of a favorable decision. However, when the commission 
appointed by the US completed its work in 1899, the border was established on the same 
Schomburgk Line that for almost a century had been questioned by both parts. In other words, 
the US decision did not benefit England’s or Venezuela’s complaints (MOREIRA, et al, 
2010:114). 
William McKinley, Cleveland’s successor in the American presidency, strengthened 
American hegemony in the continent. In this respect, his government was marked mainly by 
the Spanish-American War (1898), a turning point in the US role in the international system. 
For the first time, the country faced alone a European rival in a war and emerged victoriously. 
More than that, the war was an example of the changes that were processed in relations 
between the US and Latin America. The US victory guaranteed the independence of Cuba (up 
to that point still a Spanish colony) and also forced Spain to cede Guam, Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines to the United States. Five years later, the United States also obtained a perpetual 
lease for a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At the same time, Hawaii was also annexed 
by the US. With all that, the US secured its role as a power in the Pacific, and also reaffirmed 
the role that had been building in America, defeating a European country with colonial claims 
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on the continent. Unfortunately, by doing that, USA became very close to a colonial power 
itself (MOREIRA, et al, 2010:117-119). 
The departure of James Watson Webb from Brazil, in 1869, marks a turning point in 
relations between the two countries. The incidents that often hindered the conviviality of the 
two nations have become almost absent in the years that followed. The reason for this change 
may be linked to a closer contact between the Secretary of State and its agents in Brazil, 
partly due to improved communications between Rio de Janeiro and Washington, and partly 
due to a greater interest in Latin America. Nevertheless, the reasons behind the US policy 
towards Brazil remained the same: to promote American interests against the Old Continent’s 
ones in the Western Hemisphere, including the challenge of replacing England in the 
Brazilian foreign trade agenda (HILL, 1932:259). 
Webb was replaced by Henry T. Blow (1869-1870). Immediately upon assuming his 
post, Blow could see the lack of interest with which the Americans were seen by Brazilians. 
When asking Brazilian officials about why the admiration of previous decades had become 
cold, he received the answer that Webb was responsible for the new state of affairs. As a 
result of his performance during the War of Paraguay, and in the negotiations after the 
conflict, the feeling that the United States preferred to relate to republics and despised the 
monarchical Brazil had been awakened again among Brazilians. For his part, Blow tried to 
reverse the situation left by his predecessor, and the same can be said of his successors. 
Despite the difficulties of earlier times, the years immediately preceding the proclamation of 
the republic were marked by a growing climate of cordiality between the two countries. In 
1871 the United States and England asked D. Pedro II to indicate a Brazilian arbitrator to join 
the arbitral tribunal in the case of Alabama between those two countries (HILL, 1932:260). 
Similarly, in 1880 Brazil arbitrated pending claims between the US and France (HILL, 
1932:262). In addition, the growing export of Brazilian coffee to the United States favored the 
rapprochement between the two countries, although the valorization policy practiced later by 
the republican governments would be controversial in diplomatic terms (HILL, 1932:297-
300; SMITH, 1991, 6, 19, 32-37, 46-47, 153, 30-32, 46, 76, 95; SMITH, 2010:7, 9, 24, 58, 
76). 
In sum, although the “traditional friendship” between the two countries is a 
characteristic of Brazilian republican period, certainly it can be said that the roots of this 
relationship were already established in the monarchy (HILL, 1932:259-260). 
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Brazil-USA relations in the early republic: Republicanism and Americanism 
 
It was amid this international context that the Republic was proclaimed in Brazil by a 
military coup on November 15, 1889. The sudden proclamation of the Republic in Brazil led 
to a peculiar (and even embarrassing) situation to the Brazilian delegation sent by the 
monarchical government to the Pan-American Conference in Washington. Lafaiete Rodrigues 
Pereira, the leader of the delegation (a monarchist) resigned from office and the following 
year the Republican Salvador de Menezes Drummond Furtado de Mendonça, assumed the 
leadership of it (SMITH, 1991:9, 11). 
Salvador de Mendonça was a pioneer of the Brazilian republican movement started in 
the 1870s, and, besides a diplomat, was a journalist, lawyer, novelist, essayist, poet, 
playwright and translator. He was also one of the founders of the Brazilian Academy of 
Letters2. Mendonça was born in Itaboraí, state of Rio de Janeiro, in 1841. In 1859 he moved 
to São Paulo to study at the Law School there. The following year he founded a newspaper 
with  Teófilo Ottoni Filho, another republican. In the same year, he returned to Rio as a 
journalist, working for Saldanha Marinho, yet another republican. In 1865 he became a 
teacher at the Pedro II School. In 1867 he went back to São Paulo to finish his Law studies. In 
the following years, he was divided between journalism, in favor of republicanism, and Law. 
Finally, in 1870, he founded the Republican Club with several of his companions and was the 
writer of part of the republican manifest of the same year. He also continued working as a 
journalist, this time more openly advocating the republican regime. 
Despite the Republican propaganda, in 1875 Mendonça was appointed private consul 
of the Empire in Baltimore, and soon after was appointed to the consulate in New York. On 
May 3, 1876, he was promoted to Consul General of Brazil in the United States. On July 6, 
1889, he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on special mission 
in the United States and delegate of Brazil to the 1st International Conference of American 
States. He was in this position, along with Lafaiete Rodrigues Pereira, when the Republic was 
proclaimed in Brazil. While Lafaiete Rodrigues resigned from office, Mendonça took the 
defense of the regime implemented by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca in Brazil. As it had 
occurred some 60 years earlier with James Monroe, Benjamin Harrison hesitated for a while 
to recognize the new regime in Brazil (SMITH, 1991:9-10). Ironically, this reservation was in 
part based on a genuine admiration for Dom Pedro II in the US, but thanks to the efforts of 
                                                 
2 “Salvador de Mendonça, in: http://www.academia.org.br/abl/cgi/cgilua.exe/sys/start.htm?infoid=183&sid=219. 
Acess in: January 28, 2013. 
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Mendonça, recognition by the United States came quickly, and with it recognition by the 
other republics of the continent (SMITH, 1991:12-13).  
Although Mendonça asked to be dismissed off the office of Consul General of Brazil 
in New York on April 12, 1890, his work as a minister in special mission was maintained. 
Quintino Bocaiúva, another old republican, was named the first chancellor of the republic. 
Mendonça received from Bocaiúva the instructions to follow an “American spirit” in the 
negotiations at the Conference. This American spirit had been defined by Bocaiúva many 
years earlier in his manifesto of the Brazilian Republican Party: "we are in America and we 
want to be American" (BOCAIÚVA, 1986). That is to say: in the vocabulary of Bocaiúva, the 
words American and Republican were confused. His understanding was that being a 
monarchy, Brazil was an aberration in the New World. At the same time, he understood that a 
change of regime, from monarchy to republic, would imply an automatic cordiality between 
Brazil and the other countries of the continent. A central example of this was the signing of 
the Treaty of Montevideo on January 25, 1890. By this treaty, Brazil and Argentina agreed 
with the splitting of the disputed territory of Palmas. Although defended by the chancellor, 
this solution to the border dispute underwent profound opposition and was not approved by 
Congress in Brazil (BUENO e CERVO 2002:167). Another example of this republican 
approach was the attempt of the French Republic to subordinate diplomatic recognition of the 
new government to the favorable solution on the question of limits with Brazil in Amapá, still 
in 1890. 
Under Bocaiúva’s instructions, Brazil accepted the compulsory arbitration and sought 
an understanding with the US. With the end of the Congress, Mendonça was immediately 
appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of 1st class in Washington 
(BUENO e CERVO, 2002:170-172). The “American Spirit” was, therefore, a basis of the new 
foreign policy regime established in Brazil. Quintino Bocaiúva tried to follow also a 
“republican” stance in his foreign policy, a concept that in his vocabulary was practically 
synonymous with the “American spirit” mentioned (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:162).  
Salvador de Mendonça, as mentioned, remained in the US as minister plenipotentiary 
in Washington. Finished the Pan-American Congress and achieved the American recognition 
of the republican government, Mendonça started a new task: the commercial rapprochement 
between the US and Brazil. On January 31, 1891, he took an important step in this matter with 
the signing in Washington of the Reciprocity Treaty between Brazil and the US, known as 
Blaine-Mendonça Agreement. This treaty established a customs agreement with preferential 
tariffs between the two countries. It suffered a lot of criticism, but was still recognized by the 
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Brazilian Congress (SMITH, 1991:7, 14-19, 26, 31). In the following month was enacted a 
Republican Constitution in Brazil, inspired by the American model. 
Reflecting the Marshall Floriano government’s instability, more than five foreign 
ministers occupied the office between 1891 and 1894 (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:163). 
However, the analysis conducted so far already allows to demonstrate an important point: 
before Rio Branco assumed as chancellor, in 1902, the foreign policy of the republic already 
had an Americanist character. However, unlike the Americanism of the Baron of Rio Branco 
and Joaquim Nabuco, this Americanism from 1889 to 1902 was eminently ideological in 
character, and it was not necessarily North Americanist (BUENO e CERVO, 2002:167). It 
was mainly based on the republican ideal expressed by Quintino Bocaiúva, first chancellor of 
the Republic. 
 Quintino Bocaiuva’s foreign policy was far from universal praise. In 1893, Eduardo 
Prado (Rio Branco’s protégé) published The American Illusion, a book that criticized the 
republican's perception that Brazil and USA could be friends. Prado's opinion was basically 
realist: countries don't have friends, they have interests, and the USA would not give up 
interests simply to favor Brazil, doesn’t matter the regime similarity the two countries had 
now.  
That same year Brazil faced the Revolta da Armada when the Navy in Rio de Janeiro 
rebelled against the Floriano government. Salvador de Mendonça managed to prevent the 
United States from recognizing the rebels as lawful belligerents, something that would have 
complicated the Floriano regime even more. The rebellion was defeated the following year 
with US aid, which intervened in favor of the established government (SMITH, 1991:20). But 
Brazil-USA relations went from bad to worse: later that year, in August, the US denounced 
the Treaty of Reciprocity signed in 1891, now considered of little value. The Brazil mimicked 
the gesture next month.  
Also in 1893, Rio Branco returned to South America after a long period in Europe. He 
was appointed head of the mission entrusted to defend Brazil’s rights to the territory of 
Palmas or Missiones, disputed with Argentina. The matter was taken to arbitration of 
President Grover Cleveland. The Baron defended the case with President Cleveland, who 
decreed an entirely favorable arbitration award to the Brazilian claims on February 5, 1895 
(SMITH, 1991:12, 27). One of the reasons for Cleveland's decision was that the disputed 
region was massively populated by Brazilians. In addition, the new frontier favored Brazil's 
defense. The Argentine arguments, on the other hand, were based more on feeling than on 
practicality (HILL, 1932:282-283). 
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In 1894 Prudente de Morais was elected the first civilian president of Brazil, ending 
the dictatorship of Floriano Peixoto. The foreign policy of his government would soon have to 
deal with difficulties: in January 1895 England secretly occupied the Trindade Island. 
Discovered the fact, the British claimed that it was a territory abandoned by Brazilians and 
that their goal was to use the island to connect submarine cables. At first, the Brazilian 
government rejected a proposal of arbitration in this case, but eventually, after the mediation 
from Portugal, Britain recognized the sovereignty of Brazil on the island. Next May, shortly 
after the English invasion of Trindade, another European country disrespected the Brazilian 
sovereignty over its territory: France tried to occupy Amapá. This invasion was rejected by 
the local population (GARCIA, 2005:108). Brazil's difficulties worsened in the following 
years: in 1897, shortly after arriving at the White House, William McKinley proposed a treaty 
of trade reciprocity to Brazil, but Brazilians declined it due to the economic difficulties 
(SMITH, 1991:29-34). 
In the midst of these events, in 1898, the Baron was in charge of advocating Brazil in 
another territorial dispute, this time the Amapá issue with France. This time the referee of the 
issue was Walter Hauser, president of the Federal Council of Switzerland. Again the decision 
of the arbitration, sentenced on December 1, 1900, was fully in favor of Brazil. The Oiapoque 
River was defined as border, according to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 (rediscovered thanks 
to the Baron’s talent as historian). With one more diplomatic victory, the Baron acquired great 
popularity. After his mission in Amapá, he was appointed minister plenipotentiary in Berlin 
on December 31, 1900 (SMITH, 1991:38, 43, 49). Meanwhile, that same year, Salvador de 
Mendonça was removed from the legation of Brazil in Washington and sent to Lisbon, and 
replaced in the US by Assis Brasil. On the occasion of his departure from the United States, 
Mendonça was characterized as “America's friend” and “great Pan-American” in articles of 
American newspapers and by President McKinley himself. However, his removal to Lisbon 
was not approved by the Senate in Brazil, and eventually, he was exonerated of the new 
position (SMITH, 1991:33). 
The following years were of great turmoil for Brazilian foreign policy and the 
international system in general. The First Hague Conference was held in 1899. Too entangled 
in domestic issues, Brazil did not participate. The Brazilian absence at the conference did not 
have permanent consequences, but at that moment Brazil left to the world an image of 
disinterest that contrasted with the tendencies of Brazilian foreign policy of the 19th century 
(SMITH, 1991:27-28, 57-58). The same year the Argentine president Julio Roca visited 
Brazil. It was the first visit by a foreign head of state to the country. Brazilian president 
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Campos Sales returned the gesture the following year, visiting Argentina in October. It was 
the first official visit by a Brazilian president to another country. This exchange of amenities 
could indicate the building of good relations between neighboring countries, but in the long 
run that was not exactly what happened. Among other factors, unlike Campos Sales, the 
Baron and Nabuco did not see Argentina with good eyes.  
In 1901 began a crisis that marked the Baron’s relationship with the Foreign Ministry: 
the battle for Acre. The Bolivian Syndicate, an Anglo-American consortium based in New 
York, leased Acre from Bolivia in a granting similar to the chartered companies in Africa. In 
the same year, with the death of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt became US 
president. At the same time, Brazil and England signed a treaty of arbitration in relation to 
British Guiana. The following year England won the Boer War in South Africa, which in 




The Baron of Rio Branco was one of the most important diplomats in Brazilian 
history. His contributions to Brazilian foreign policy were many, highlighting the change of 
the Brazilian diplomatic axis from Europe (mainly England) to the United States. The Baron 
feared that Brazil would soon fall victim to European imperialism and that the country would 
not have the military means to defend itself. Faced with this, he understood that the 
diplomatic rapprochement with the US would be the best defense for Brazil. The Baron's 
perception that the United States was an emerging power and that the re-reading of the 
Monroe Doctrine by Theodore Roosevelt was positive for Brazil proved correct, and the 
foreign policy paradigm he established remained with little opposition until the early 1960s. 
As has been said, the Baron established an "unwritten alliance" with the United States.  
The Baron was not alone. Joaquim Nabuco, chosen to be Brazil's first ambassador to 
Washington, had a very similar perception of early 20th century international relations, as 
well as other Brazilian intellectuals and leaders of that time. However, it is important to note 
that the Baron did not build his paradigm ex nihilo. The USA was the first country to 
recognize Brazil's independence from Portugal and had continuous diplomatic relations with 
it during the 19th century. Although Brazil-USA relations in that period were often cold and 
distant, and not always friendly, it should also be noticed that since the Civil War, and 
especially since the 1870s, the two countries experienced greater rapprochement, thanks to 
increasing commercial trade, deeper diplomatic relations, and even technological innovations, 
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besides USA's desire to be more present in Latin America's affairs. With all that in mind, Rio 
Branco's and Nabuco's contribution to Brazil-USA relations remain very important, but it can 
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